Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Fairness and Bargaining Power in Threshold Public Goods Experiments
Authors: 徐麗振
Keywords: public goods;fairness;sequential game;dictator game
Date: 2007-07
Issue Date: 2009-01-06 15:24:03 (UTC+8)
Abstract: Experiments on three two-person threshold public good provision games, namely, the simultaneous, sequential, and dictator games, are conducted to explore the motives behind giving. Players who move simultaneously are endowed with equal bargaining power, and players who move first are endowed with more bargaining power than players who move subsequently. Dictators are indubitably endowed with complete bargaining power. Since the differences between the bargaining powers of two playersn increase from the simultaneous to the sequential to the dictator game, comparisons among games allow us to trace whether the contribution behavior is motivated by fairness or is simply due to the strategic concern. The experimental evidence shows that the strategic concern explains the overall contribution behavior better than the motive of fairness. However, in the final round 26% of the dictators share the threshold evenly with their opponents, suggesting that some subjects do play fairly.
Relation: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21(2), 151-167
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
151167.pdf314KbAdobe PDF1134View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing