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Title: Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure
Authors: 何靜嫺
Keywords: coalition structure, evolutionarily stable, folk theorem
Date: 2002-04
Issue Date: 2009-01-09 12:19:04 (UTC+8)
Abstract: We analyze the formation andstability of coalitions for a situation where
finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a
noncooperative game with different coalitions, and examine the moving path of individuals among
various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable
coalition equilibrium in fnπ . When addressing the evolving path of coalitions, we conclude that in
the case of symmetric strategies and symmetric population shares, if each coalition's population
share is too small, the equilibrium requires a reduction of the number of coalitions, but if each
coalition share is too large, the equilibrium requires an increase of the number of coalitions.
Furthermore, when ui(.)s are symmetric but x is asymmetric, then (i) the
highest payoffs are oscillatory across time still stability happens. (ii)In the
evolutionarily stable structure, each group share the same population and the coalition numbers is
hence IDt(x, 1ft)I.
Relation: Nonlinear Dynamics Psychology and Life Sciences,6(2),160-170
Data Type: article
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