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Title: An Economic Analysis of Military Intelligence
Authors: 何靜嫺
Ho, Shirley J.
Date: 2007-12
Issue Date: 2009-01-09 12:19:09 (UTC+8)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of military intelligence by using the approach in contract theory to understand when a spy will be hired by a country, why a spy will defect, and how the enemy can use a double agent to fight back. Most importantly, we will provide four solutions to this defection problem in a spy contract using related discussions in the economic literature.
Relation: Peace and Defence Economics,18(6),485-493
Data Type: article
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Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

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