Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23296| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | 何靜嫺 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator | Ho, Shirley J. | - |
| dc.date | 2007-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-01-09T04:19:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2009-01-09T04:19:09Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-01-09T04:19:09Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/23296 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of military intelligence by using the approach in contract theory to understand when a spy will be hired by a country, why a spy will defect, and how the enemy can use a double agent to fight back. Most importantly, we will provide four solutions to this defection problem in a spy contract using related discussions in the economic literature. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation | Peace and Defence Economics,18(6),485-493 | en_US |
| dc.title | An Economic Analysis of Military Intelligence | en_US |
| dc.type | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/10242690701197571 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690701197571 | en_US |
| item.grantfulltext | open | - |
| item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
| item.openairetype | article | - |
| item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
| item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
| item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
| Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 | |
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