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Title: 2005年中美、中歐紡織品配額貿易談判之政治經濟分析
The Politics of Sino-US and Sino-EU Textile Quota Negotiations in 2005
Authors: 吳文欽
Wu, Wen Chin
Contributors: 何思因
Ho, Szu Yin
Wu, Wen Chin
Keywords: 紡織品貿易
textile trade
quota neotiation
international bargaining
two level game theory
Date: 2006
Issue Date: 2009-09-19 15:28:43 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 國際貿易會決定國內不同行為者的利益分配,促使國內產生主張自由貿易與支持保護主義的陣營,進而影響貿易政策的制訂。本論文以紡織品貿易為主題,首先闡述保護主義為何在貿易自由化浪潮中,依舊能夠貫穿20世紀後半葉的紡織品貿易,卻又在1990年代末期開始式微;其次,本論文分析當全球紡織品貿易於2005年全面取消配額之後,中國紡織品的大量出口,如何引發進口國內部保護主義勢力的反撲,令歐盟和美國先後和中國重新展開紡織品配額談判。最後,本論文分析歐、美境內自由貿易與保護主義兩個陣營,如何影響和中國的談判結果,並藉此比較具有不同制度的經濟體,如何回應國際經濟秩序的變化。

本文援引Robert Putnam所提出的「雙層賽局」分析架構,並進一步討論國內制度如何國際談判產生影響。經研究後發現,歐盟和美國內部的政治聯盟是影響談判結果的重要因素。這兩起談判雖然都源於本國紡織業者在受到中國紡織品的強力挑戰之後,進而要求政府必須出面解決這個問題,但是,由於歐盟和美國內部政治制度設計的不同,讓不同陣營有不同的施力空間,最後使得兩起談判結果有所差異。在歐盟方面,紡織產業和進口商之間的衝突,透過歐盟尊重多元的政治制度設計而有了旗鼓相當的局勢,因此歐盟執委會出面和中國談判之前,必須兼顧這兩個陣營的利益,令歐盟和中國的談判結果較有利於中國紡織品出口。但是在美國方面,儘管進口商和紡織業者之間的利益也是有所衝突,不過紡織業者最後透過政治運作而佔了上風,加上美國政府也希望藉由限制中國紡織品來降低對中國的貿易逆差,使得中美談判的結果對中國較為嚴格,具有濃厚的保護主義色彩。
International trade distributes various interests to actors, who then form two camps supporting free trade and protectionism, respectively. Both two camps also influence the decision-making of trade policy. This thesis focuses on textile trade and analyzes why protectionism could prevail in the textile trade during the second half of 20th century, and why it declined in the end of 1990s. Second, this thesis analyzes how China’s considerable textile exports after 2005 incur resistances of protectionists in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Those protectionists request their government to negotiate with China on textile products. However, those requests attract the counterpunches from supporters of free trade.

By rendering the “Two-level Game Theory”, this thesis discovers that the domestic coalitions in the EU and the US significantly determine the results of negotiations. Although both negotiations result from powerful challenges of Chinese textile products, the EU and the US have their own institutional designs and then take different responses. In the EU, conflicts between textile industry and textile importers are of approximately equal strength. The European Commission has to hold an eclectic position between the supporters of free trade and protectionists. As a result, the results of EU-Sino negotiation favor China’s textile export to the European market. On the other hand, even though there are conflicts between textile producers and importers, producers get the upper hand by lobbying politicians. In addition, because the US government also intends to reduce the US’ tremendous trade deficit with China by limiting China’s textile product, the US-Sino textile quota negotiation is much more protectionism-oriented.
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三、 網站部分:
世界貿易組織(World Trade Organization)
自由貿易協會(Free Trade Association)
美國全國紡織協會(National Textile Association)
美國紡織品服裝進口商協會(United States Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel)
美國紡織品與成衣服裝辦公室 (Office of Textile and Apparel):
美國紡織團體協會(National Council of Textile Organizations)
美國參議院(The U.S. Senate)
美國商務部(The U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
美國國會圖書館(Library of Congress)
美國眾議院(The U.S. House)
美國普查局(The U.S. Census of Bureau)
美國貿易談判代表署(Office of the United State Trade Representative)
美國製造商貿易行動聯盟(American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition)
國際紡織成衣局(International Textile and Clothing Bureau)
歐洲各國紡織品進口商協會(European Association of National Organizations of Textile Retailer)
歐洲消費者組織(European Consumer’s Organization)
歐洲紡織成衣組織(European Apparel and Textile Organization)
歐洲議會(European Parliament)
歐盟執委會(European Commission)
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