Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/34708
題名: 仿冒查緝與政治獻金
作者: 楊敦雅
貢獻者: 王智賢
楊敦雅
關鍵詞: 智慧財產權
政治獻金
日期: 2007
上傳時間: 18-Sep-2009
摘要: 在「商標」與「知識」等無形資產逐漸成為經濟社會中重要生產要素的今日,保障其所有權是維持市場秩序的重要方式之一,為此我國公平交易法第二十條與智慧財產相關法律均有相關規範。本文由政治獻金遊說的角度出發,探討當此類無形資產掌握在外國廠商手中時,本國民選政府如何制定最適的仿冒查緝率。本文研究發現,在沒有利益團體遊說的情況下,本國政府的最適查緝率為零;然若外國正版商的參與政治獻金遊說,即使本國政府對全國福利的重視程度相對於政治獻金兩倍以上,外國正版商的遊說仍可能大幅改變本國政府的選擇,使查緝率大幅提升至仿冒能夠在市場生存的查緝上限;若外國正版商與本國消費者均付出政治獻金遊說,則雙方將會落入類似囚犯的困境中。
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
94255004
96
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0094255004
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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