人民幣實質匯率之研究

Abstract

本文採用1990年至2004年10月之月資料，建立人民幣出口、進口及雙邊貿易之三項實質有效匯率指數。考量中國大陸特殊政、經情勢，以及加入WTO後，進出口貿易更加自由化的前提下，運用中國大陸進出口值、物價水準，建立人民幣實質有效匯率指數，所依循理論較無疑慮，而援引之數據亦無太大爭議。\n為貼近中共當局宣稱建立「符合市場經濟的靈活的匯率制度」，本文選擇與中國前十二大貿易夥伴組成一籃子貨幣，用以編纂人民幣實質有效匯率指數，將現行釘住美元之匯率改為釘住「一籃子」貨幣，能有效反映人民幣價值，亦可衡量中國外貿競爭力。\n實證結果發現，相對於基期(2000年)，1990∼1993年指數多低於100，幣值高估；1994年匯率併軌，匯價發生結構性改變，幣值過度低估，後指數逐步下跌，1997年趨近均衡匯率。1997年亞洲金融風暴至2002年，甚至出現與均衡匯率並無太大偏離現象，即便有所失調亦能在短期內適切調整。2002年下半年至2004年年底，匯價低估趨勢確立，但偏離均衡匯率僅5％上下，幅度不太。\n中國宣稱要「和平崛起」，自應承擔更多國際義務，人民幣升值是無可違逆的趨勢。為避免干擾經濟發展，勢必採行積極之管理浮動匯率制度，釘住一籃子貨幣並設定幅度狹窄之浮動區間「微調」。匯價調整時機，除衡酌自身經濟面的條件，尚須納入國際政治面的考量，由中共官方談話研判，人民幣升值，將是無預警的，出其不意的。

In this paper monthly data from 1990 through October 2004 are used to establish real effective exchange rate indices of RMB for export, import and bilateral trading respectively. These real effective exchange rate indices are established taking the particular political and economic conditions in China into consideration, based on the increasingly liberation of importation and exportation after joining WTO, and using China’s import and export volume as well as its CPI. The theory used is doubtlessly correct and there is no much dispute on the data referred herein.\n\nTo adhere with what the China government proclaimed: “a flexible exchange rate meeting the market economics”, currencies of its top 12 trade partners are selected for a basket of currencies instead of pegging to US dollar, in forming the real effective exchange rate indices. These indices can effectively reflect RMB’s true value, and measure China’s foreign trade competition.\n\nAccording to the result of verification, in comparing with the base period (2000), the indices for 1990 – 1993 were mostly less than 100, representing that RMB was overvalued. In 1994 the exchange rates were unified, resulting in a structural change on foreign exchange rate, RMB was undervalued. Then, these indices fell gradually, and the exchange rate tended to become balanced in 1997. From 1997, while the Asian financial crisis happened, till 2002, there was no much deviation from the balanced exchange rate, i.e., even there was any out of balance, it was adjusted properly within a relatively short time. From the second half of 2002 till the end of 2004, the tendency of undervaluation was ascertained, by the deviation was only about 5%, the range was not so much.\n\nProclaiming that it is going to “peacefully rise”, China should assume more international liabilities, and the appreciation of RMB is a non-reversible trend. To avoid interference to its economic development, China has no choice but to adopt an aggressively control on its floating exchange rate regime, pegging to a basket of currencies and setting up a relatively narrow range of tunnel for “snaking”. In addition of its own political economy, international political situation must be taken into consideration for timing of its exchange rate adjustment. From some China government officials’ statements, it can be seen that appreciation of RMB would be done without any warning in advance and unexpectedly.