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THE IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON THE LABOR MARKET: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
National Health Insurance
Employment Protection Legislation
|Issue Date:||2009-09-18 16:02:49 (UTC+8)|
本論文中, 我們以台灣為對象, 分別探討兩項公共政策對勞動市場的效果。首
稅, 加上健保費與健保福利兩者在制度中並沒有任何關聯, 因此, 在這樣的機制之下, 我們認為全民健保的實施對勞動市場將可能形成負面衝擊。我們的
實證結果發現, 全民健保的實施的確會使勞動市場均衡工時下降, 但對均衡
性的勞動法規, 在勞基法實施後, 勞工在就業上受到許多保障, 但相對的, 卻提高了雇主的解雇成本。雇主很可能為了因應較高的解雇成本而減少解雇數
量, 且在雇用新進員工時也變得相對保守, 使勞動市場的流動將會因此降低,
施會使勞動市場流動下降。而且, 當勞動檢查越嚴格時, 勞動市場流動亦下
The original purpose of most labor market policies is to enhance social welfare of a specific group of individuals and sustain a fair social relationship. However, the labor market may be distorted by the introduction of these public policies. In this thesis we examine the labor market effects of two public policies in Taiwan. Firstly, we investigates the impacts of national health insurance on the labor market. Taiwan's national health insurance is financed by premiums, which are proportional to an employee's salary. These premiums may introduce distortions to the labor market. Based on repeated cross-sections of individual data we find that, on average, private sector employees' work hours declined relative to their public sector counterparts, while their relative wage rates were almost unchanged with the introduction of national health insurance. Secondly, we investigates the effects of employment protection legislation on the rates of worker flows, job reallocation, and churning flows. Our study’s empirical identification takes advantage of the natural experiment created by Taiwan's enactment of Labor Standards Law, which substantially increases the costs of firing an employee, in 1984 and the subsequent measures of
the law’s enforcement. Moreover, our identification also exploits the fact that in Taiwan the stringency of Labor Standards Law’s provisions and the intensity of the
law's enforcement vary with establishment size. Our analysis is based on monthly data at the establishment level for the period 1983–1995. We find that Taiwan’s Labor Standards Law and its enforcement measures dampen worker and job turnover rates for medium-sized and large establishments, and the dampening effects vary with establishment size.
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