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Title: No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis
Authors: 廖郁萍
Yu-Ping Liao
Michelle J. White
Liao, Y-P.
White, M.J.
Contributors: 經濟學系
Date: 2002
Issue Date: 2010-03-25 09:06:47 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often.
Relation: American Law and Economics Review 4(2),258-294
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

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