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https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38240
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| Title: | No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis |
| Authors: | 廖郁萍 Yu-Ping Liao Michelle J. White Liao, Y-P. White, M.J. |
| Contributors: | 經濟學系 |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2010-03-25 09:06:47 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often. |
| Relation: | American Law and Economics Review 4(2),258-294 |
| Data Type: | article |
| Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 期刊論文 |
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