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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/38240
題名: | No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis | 作者: | 廖郁萍 Yu-Ping Liao Michelle J. White Liao, Y-P. White, M.J. |
貢獻者: | 經濟學系 | 日期: | 2002 | 上傳時間: | 25-三月-2010 | 摘要: | This article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often. | 關聯: | American Law and Economics Review 4(2),258-294 | 資料類型: | article |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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aler-reprint.pdf | 172.88 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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