山寨創新模式之探討

Abstract

資源與能力薄弱的新興國小型後進廠商，為何能超越歐美先進廠商搶佔新興市場？在此研究動機之下，本研究透過質性研究之紮根理論，利用次級資料、廠商訪談、通路觀察等方法，收集產業體系、創新平台、經營環境等背景因素，以及產品/廠商定義、競爭優勢、創新特性、廠商樣貌等資料，解析中國手機產業之山寨廠商創新模式，並經由汽車、筆記型電腦等跨產業應用個案之對照，藉以延伸從創新獲利（Profit from Innovation）、顛覆式創新（Disruptive Innovation）、後進廠商（Late Entrant）的理論架構，作為新興國家後進廠商發展創新事業模式的思考架構。\r\n\r\n本研究發現：山寨模式能迅速、持續地佔有新興市場，關鍵在於價值活動重組、垂直聯盟、市場試驗。首先，透過「重組價值活動」，在既有產業體系的邊陲地帶建構獨特的價值網絡，以提升市場反應速度、塑造成本優勢、調適不同作業流程。其次，在爭取生存空間的前提下，各自發揮核心能力，合力建構共同創新的「垂直聯盟」，彌補自身資源、能力的不足，並分散技術、市場風險，與機動形塑組織樣貌。再者，透過多樣化、高性價比、快速反應市場的產品，進行「市場試驗」，從動態、模糊的利基市場出發，逐步前進主流市場。

Why the overall market shares of international companies in the Chinese market dropped from over 90% in 2000 to under 50% due to competitions from local brands and Shanzhai phones? Why Nokia, the company that dominates the Chinese and Indian mobile phone markets has a 60% market share in India, but less than 30% in China? The key to this difference lies in differences in degree of industrial system development, resulting in varied market competition conditions.\r\nIn recent years, through the “simplicity/reduction/ frugality” Shanzhai model, small local companies have dominated the local market and replaced the local brands under active government promotion. The products have been exported to India, Southeast Asia, and other emerging markets, making MediaTek Inc. one of the world’s top 5 IC design companies as well as the rapid development of the “Shanzhai model” in other sectors. Many firms now attach great importance to the challenges and underlying business opportunities ahead. The Government in Mainland China even changed from initially rejecting the idea into positioning it as the “primary innovation” for underdeveloped countries. \r\nSo, is “Shanzhai Model” a speculative bubble from the underground economy of the emerging markets or is it a unique and innovative business model or a competitor that deserves firms’ attention? Most people raise questions over its sustainable business development from perspectives of copying, illegality, and hit-and-run. However, for more than four years since its development (specifically since the emergence of Shanzhai phones in the Chinese mobile phone market in 2005), there has been considerable increase in growth and market share (i.e., over 30% market share in 2008). In view of some firms’ successful transformation into the leading local brands (such as Tianyu, Beijing), interdisciplinary development (T.V., notebook computer, automobile, T.V. programs), etc., by analyzing the innovations in development strategies will perhaps help solve the puzzle of their competitiveness.\r\nThe Shanzhai model is defined as “The flexible use of capabilities and resources in and outside the organization not bound by organizational boundaries through industrial vertical alliance of new firms in emerging countries. In consideration to Price-to-Performance Ratio, in order to reduce costs and enhance the target of customer value perception, accept or reject product features freely, quality (lifespan, safety), intellectual property, brand, taxes, and breakthroughs in consumer income, region, and time. Moreover, through consumer information feedback, products are quickly adjusted to meet consumer needs, surpass advanced American and European firms, gain entry in the “good-enough segment” market, and in turn create revenues.\r\nIn view of the practical implications, this study is expected to shape two dimensions including the capability of the “Price-to-Performance Ratio” in reducing costs and the speed of market response through interviews with middle stream and downstream mobile phone, automobile, and notebook PC firms in the Greater China Region in order to analyze the strategic alliance underneath Shanzhai firms in Mainland China and the possibility of long-term survival. \r\nTheoretically, the literature reviews cover firms with abundant resources and capabilities in process innovation and complementary assets according to Christensen and Rosenbloom. Based on the value network perspective, although first movers with inferior technology defeat the leading firms that chose the existing major clients over the opportunity to invest in the latest technology and the late-entrants succeeded at the expense of the established firms. Therefore, the focus lies in resolving the established firms’ management agendas in response to disrupted innovation while research cases and the late-entrants’ framework of thought are relatively scarce. \r\nTherefore, the innovative business model for late-entrants of emerging countries shall serve as basis in exploring the late-entrants with scarce resources and capabilities and how they surpass the first movers in the emerging market. The vertical strategic alliance framework will be elaborated. The key to the first movers’ success is further discussed as basis for the late-entrants’ framework of thought in the innovative business model.\r\n\r\nThe existing literature generally attributes the success of attackers to the failure of first movers. First movers’ failure to cultivate process capabilities (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978, 2004), inability to secure technological appropriability, lack of complementary assets required for commercialization (Teece, 1986, 2006), restrictions of sunk costs (Richard A. D‘Aveni, 1994), or limitations in investment decision making due to considerations of the existing mainstream customers (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995) gave the attackers the chance to flourish. Although we know the reasons that contribute to the first movers’ failure, we are unable to find out the secret to the innovative attackers’ success. Just as Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier (2006) mentioned, in order for firms to derive profits, other than taking appropriability of value into consideration, the creation of value is also worth noting. Also, Teece et al. (1997) believe that in terms of privately owned resource creation, discovering new opportunities and efficient and effective organization to seize the opportunities are of fundamental importance rather than engaging in strategies that cause competitors to lose balance or increase costs, or barricading newcomers. In order for attackers to surpass the first movers, it takes more than beating the opponent that has made mistakes in the competition; it is the innovative business model that has created higher values for the customers. Therefore, in order to find answers to the outcomes, we must first review what mistakes the first mover has made and analyze what the attacker has done right.\r\nIn addition, Teece’s PFI (1986, 2006), Christensen’s disruptive innovation (1995, 1997, 2003, 2004), and the victory of attackers’ in emerging countries and related literature mostly focus on the organizational level rather than analysis on industrial level. Most of them interpret the success of the attackers from the internal organization perspectives. And analysis on attackers’ good use of the industrial system despite their lack of resources and capabilities is not much covered. \r\n\r\nAlthough the Shanzhai model has been under development for a very long time, the real concern for all fields originated from China’s mobile phone industry.Shanzhai firms of mobile phones, automobiles, and notebook computers in China have been selected as the study objects.\r\nThe main purpose of this study is to explore the late-entrants in emerging countries that are seemingly counterfeiting and lack innovation by analyzing the development strategies of Shanzhai firms in mobile phone, automobile, and notebook computer sectors in Mainland China and the reason why they grow year after year. Since analysis on the development of the underground economies of developing countries is involved, in the absence of credible information, the study has established its research validity through three different data. First of all, secondary data, media reports, and related reports of companies and research units were collected to gain a preliminary understanding of the industrial environment, market development status, and strategies and actions of firms. Secondly, in order to overcome factors such as Shanzhai firms’ covert action, concealed information, and differed strategic types, and avoidance of information from single source that result in “taking a part for the whole” and bias, the researcher scheduled interviews in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen China for a period of one week to half a month in Auguest 2006, June 2007, September 2008, November 2008, September 2009, and October 2009 and non-structural interviews by telephone interview. Presidents GMs, R and D vice presidents, business vice presidents, and marketing managers of 55 enterprises and units including 94 component manufacturers, design centers, assembly manufacturers, retailers, think tanks, and private equity firms were interviewed (136 interviews).\r\nIn terms of analysis, this study focuses on industry in order to enhance the practical application value.In data analysis, we used the grounded theory techniques, and through three steps of analysis focusing on market competition dynamics, relative competitive advantage and innovative model respectively, we gradually uncovered the phenomenon and reasons why Shanzhai firms can build a strong presence in the emerging market.\r\n\r\nIn view of Shanzhai firms’ innovative model of mobile phones, notebook computers and automobiles in China, three keys are summarized including: value activity restructuring, vertical alliance and market testing.\r\n (1)Value Activity Restructuring\r\nDue to failure to smoothly enter the global production network dominated by U.S. and European first-movers, the Shanzhai firms constructed a unique value network at border areas of industries through value-activity restructuring by using the industries’ existing infrastructure, gathering other industrial minority firms and expanding operation scope to make up for partners’ lack of capability. \r\n (2)Vertical Alliance\r\nContrary to the global production networks under the dominance of U.S. and European firms., Shanzhai firms survived by means of their core abilities and collaborated to build a common innovation platform to make up for their own lack of resources and capacity.\r\n (3)Market Testing\r\nTo conduct market testing of their highly diverse, high performance-price products to respond quickly to market changes, Shanzhai firms started in dynamic and ambiguous niche markets which first movers typically ignored to gradually move to the mainstream market. \r\n \r\nIn exploring the process and the influencing factors of the dynamic reorganization of Shanzhai firms’ value activities, this study may compensate for the lack of business model in Teece’s PFI structure on the relatively static description of complementary assets. \r\nMoving the focus from technology to business model, this study, besides supporting the Christensen’s value network and disruptive innovation viewpoint, replaces the traditional and rigid market prediction model or reliance on business leaders’ wisdom by exploring the emerging dynamic markets by launching a range of high performance-price products to test the market and respond to market changes. Meanwhile, the study of the innovative business model of attackers in emerging countries adds another perspective to first movers’ failure stressed by Teece and Christensen. \r\nAccording to research by Bhattacharya & Michael (2008), Zeng & Williamson (2008), and Kim (1997) that focused on scientific and technological imitation, innovation strategies, and innovative types of less advanced countries’ late-entrants, this study suggests that manufacturers with weak resources and capabilities utilize the existing industrial system and build an innovation platform of the unique value proposition to create competitiveness through integration. \r\nIt is found in this study that due to diverse industry features, the same innovation model may face different challenges in cross-industry applications. As most existing research work focuses discussions on the firm- or national level, this study suggests researchers ponder on the industry level related research.

第一章 緒論 1\r\n第一節 研究背景與動機 1\r\n第二節 研究問題與目的 3\r\n第二章 文獻探討 5\r\n第一節 從創新獲利 7\r\n第二節 顛覆式創新 11\r\n第三節 新興國家後進廠商發展策略 19\r\n第四節 文獻總結 21\r\n第三章 研究方法 23\r\n第一節 方法論與研究歷程 23\r\n第二節 資料收集範圍與方法 26\r\n第三節 資料分析方法 34\r\n第四章 中國大陸山寨手機廠商之創新策略 37\r\n第一節 山寨機之產品與廠商定義 37\r\n第二節 山寨機之競爭優勢 43\r\n第三節 山寨機廠商形塑競爭優勢之創新策略 47\r\n第四節 山寨機廠商不同時空下的面貌剖析 60\r\n第五章 山寨手機之制度影響因素探索 73\r\n第一節 降低進入障礙之研發平台誕生 74\r\n第二節 產業政策形塑下之中國大陸手機產業體系 84\r\n第三節 山寨產品的經營環境 92\r\n第六章 山寨模式的跨產業應用 95\r\n第一節 中國大陸小筆電個案 95\r\n第二節 中國大陸汽車廠商的山寨模式 102\r\n第三節 中國大陸平面電視廠商的山寨模式 107\r\n第七章 研究結論與意涵 109\r\n第一節 結論 109\r\n第二節 討論 115\r\n第三節 研究意涵 123\r\n參考文獻 129