中共與蘇共高層政治演變的軌跡、動力與影響

Abstract

本文透過比較中共與蘇聯兩國，解釋為何極少數共黨國家能夠跳脫絕大多數共黨國家面臨的體制缺陷，使得高層政治出現制度化的趨勢。本文認為兩國出現路徑歧異的關鍵在於領導人主要權力來源的差別－「個人權威」或「職務權力」。「個人權威型」領導人在建立歷史功勳的過程中，讓追隨者對他產生敬畏感與信任感，因而具有建立新制度，或是改變既有制度的能力。與「個人權威型」領導人相比，「職務權力型」領導人更需要爭取「推舉人團」(selectorate)多數支持，無法承受過多反彈壓力。因此，他們很難在損及「推舉人團」權益的情形下推動制度改革。由此可見，「個人權威型」領導人有利於創建制度，「職務權力型」領導人則有利於既有制度的深化繁衍。中共即是在這種情形下出現制度化趨勢。蘇聯則因制度建立者均為「職務權力型」領導人，出現人亡政息的現象。

This paper answers the question of why institutionalization of leadership replacement and decision-making occurs in a few communist regimes while others do not experience similar developments by comparing and contrasting China and the Soviet Union. The difference in top leaders main power source-personal authority or institutional power-is the key factor in answering the question. Leaders with strong personal authority are best institutions for founding because they have earned prestige and trust from followers through the process of establishing their historical feat. This gives leaders the capacity to ease objections to new rules and norms from peers and subordinates. However, rules and norms are more likely to accumulate only if successors are leaders with institutional power as the main power source. The Chinese case fits this pattern while the Soviet case does not.