制度選擇，治理性能與轉型政治---從台灣的案例看市場導向治理機制在民主化情境中的實踐

Abstract

在眾多制度抉擇與制度變遷的文獻中，甚少研究提及兩種以上制度變革同時或接續發生時會產生何種互動效果。本研究以近年最重要的民主化之政治改革以及市場導向的行政改革為例，檢視民主化情境中選擇治理機制的決定因素為何。本研究以高雄捷運、林內與鹿草垃圾焚化廠、水利會以及農會信用部等案例，檢視我國決策者在設定制度時的政治邏輯。根據新制度論的觀點，本研究假設，制度引進的目的雖在降低不確定性與交易成本，但在制度鞏固的階段，因為行動者之間的互信尚未形成，其策略性互動也未達到納許均衡，因此決策者在改革或設定另一個制度時，以投機主義策略為私利操控新制度的可能性甚大。這或許可以解釋，許多民主轉型中的國家在設立市場導向的治理體系時，都產生了外貌神似但本質差異極大的狀況。

In the vast literature on institutional choice and institutional change, very limited attention has been paid to how two or more institutional reforms might interact with each other. This research focuses on two most important reforms in recent years, democratization and market-oriented administrative reforms, to examine the possible dynamics between them. By citing several cases in Taiwan, including Kaohsiung Rapid Transit System, Linnei and Lucao Incineration Plants, Irrigation Associations, and Credit Department of Farmer’s Associations, this research will test the following proposition: when a fundamental institution is just set up, the trust among players is still absent and the Nash equilibrium is yet to reach. If at this moment the key players are assigned to set up another set of institutions essential to their interests, they tend to take opportunistic approach to at the cost of credible commitment to collective goods. This might explain why similar administrative reforms have fared largely well in most western countries but stumbled in many new democracies.