Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Other Titles:||Constituency Service and Law-Making:A Comparison before and after the Reform of Electoral System|
|Issue Date:||2011-11-14 16:52:50 (UTC+8)|
The purpose of this project is to examine the change and continuity of Taiwanese legislators on their behavior of lawmaking and constituency service. Under the old electoral system (single non-transferable vote system, SNTV), Taiwanese legislators had strong incentives to build the base of personal vote. Legislators thus tried to attract electoral support through their personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and records, rather than through their party’s reputation. When legislators pursued such a strategy, they tended to be more considerate of their constituency, conducting casework or supporting the adoption of pork barrel projects in exchange for the electoral support of their constituents. Whenever a conflict between legislators’ party and their constituency occurs, they would tend to display more loyalty towards their constituency, rather than to their party. Even though they seldom opposed their party in public, they did not follow the party line. In June 2005, the electoral system had reformed from SNTV to a mixed system of single member district plural system plus a closed-listed PR system. Then, do legislators’ representative styles and behavior change because of the reform of electoral system? If they do change, then how do they change? This two-year project focuses on a longitudinal analysis from the third to the seventh Legislative Yuan. The research period of time ranges from February 1996 to January 2012. Three major methods will be used. The first method is a survey on legislators’ assistants to know legislators’ political purposes, bill preferences, and constituency services. The second method is to conduct intensive interviews on legislators to know the ways they perceive constituency and the rationale of their choice and behavior. The third method is a content analysis on legislators’ proposing bills to know legislators’ preferences, choices, and efforts in the Legislative Yuan. I expect that Taiwanese legislators under a new system are more constituency-oriented than those under the old system. This is so because legislators need to garner votes by themselves, and they easily claim credits and hardly avoid constituent’s blames. Also, legislators face large intra-party competition when they pursue nomination within party. However, since legislators need to get more than 50 percent of votes to get re-elected, they not only have incentives to propose bills bringing benefits to the particularized group of people as before, but also have strong incentives to propose bills bringing benefits to the general public.
|Appears in Collections:||[政治學系] 國科會研究計畫|
Files in This Item:
All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.