微型金融機構貪污及其對銀行體系連結之影響

Abstract

近年來有越來越多的微型金融機構貪污的報導, 包括假貸款,甚或貸款給貪污或洗錢活動的事業用戶。對此, 一方面有許多呼籲引進商業監督系統到這些非政府微型金融機構，另一方面, 也有許多人擔心貪污對銀行體系的影響，特別是對微型金融機構-銀行聯貸機制而言, 微型金融機構扮演第三人的中間角色。本計畫之目的在於分析微型金融機構所面對的貪污決策， 以及其對微型金融機構-銀行聯貸機制的影響。本文預期得到的結果是：就算將貪污的可能性納入，在微型金融機構-銀行聯貸機制下，信用分配和策略性違約的機率均會下降。

There are growing reports on frauds in MFIs, including fictitious loans, or credits offered to clients that pursue corrupt businesses and money-laundering activities. While there are increasing calls to launch financial governance on these NGO MFIs, many would worry how corruption of this nature can damage MFIs` contributions to the credit market, particularly in the bank-linkage programme where the NGO MFIs act as third party intermediary. The purpose of this study is to analyze the corruption decisions faced by MFIs and the impacts on the bank-linkage programme as a solution to release the information problems in the credit market. Our results show that in a linkage between MFI and bank, even when there is a possibility of corruption between MFI and the borrower, the probability that the borrower puts in full effort will increase, and both the probabilities of credit rationing and strategic default will decrease