Sanctions against North Korea and Burma: Chinese Preconditions and American Dispositions

Abstract

This study examines China and the United States’ sanctions vis-à-vis the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea and Burma. The central research question is: Given China’s historical stance on sanctions is it possible to encourage China to further support the sanctions regimes against North Korea and Burma? If so, how? And if not, should the sanctions regime be modified by the sender states in order to achieve the original goals of the sanctions given China’s unwillingness to support the regime? Using all UNSC cases from 1997 to the present this study explores the likelihood of China’s involvement in sanctions by identifying what factors make China’s involvement in sanctions more likely, referred to in this study as China’s sanctions parameters. After applying China’s sanctions parameters to the cases of North Korea and Burma it is found that in North Korea, China could more rigorously uphold the spirit of the UNSC sanctions. Specifically, it is recommended that China tighten its restrictions on the export of luxury goods and further restrict and inspect DPRK planes flying over Chinese airspace. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the US apply pressure on China to change its behavior in these two areas as well as apply consistent sanctions rhetoric towards the DPRK. These recommendations are feasible as they do not overly stretch China’s sanctions parameters or overtax US capabilities. In the case of Burma, it is found that US sanctions vastly overstretch China’s sanctions parameters making it highly unlikely China will participate in the sanctions regime. Thus, it is recommended the US modify its sanctions regime to achieve the goal of liberalization in Burma.