No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof

Abstract

布藍登的《說明白》(Making It Explicit)主張一種實用主義的語意理論(pragmatic semantics)，他認為他的理論所而臨最大的挑戰，是呈現出他的理論不會違反以下這個客觀性原則：我們的態度所關於的對象是超越我們的態度的。布藍登書中總其成的一章是第八章，在該章中，他直接面對那個挑戰，他試圖證明他的理論不會有以下的後果：(P)［(S)（S宣稱P）→P］（名為「無社羣錯誤條件句」，NO Communal Error Condition）。在本文中，我論證布藍登的論證是失敗的，同時我也將證明「無社羣錯誤條件句」以及布藍登所謂的「無第一人稱錯誤條件句」（No Communal Error Condition, (P) ［（我宣稱P）→P］）在適度且微幅的修正下，將可從他的實用主義的語意理論中導出。\r\nBrandom recognizes one of the most serious conceptual challenges facing the pragmatic semantics advocated his Making It Explicit is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes. And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter eight to demonstrate that his account does not force upon itself the undesirable consequence that (p)[(S) (S claims that p)→p], dubbed the No Communal Error Condition. In this paper, Ⅰ shall argue that Brandom`s proof fails, and, moreover, I prove that both the No Communal Error Condition and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition, (p) [(I claim that p)→p]), with minor modifications, will result from his pragmatic account.