保險公司管理策略對再保險、經營績效與風險承擔行為之影響分析

Abstract

保險業之經營具有高度的社會性，其經營管理之安全性也是眾\r\n所關切的議題，因此對於保險業經營風險決策行為的研究，一\r\n直都是個十分重要的議題，再加上我國保險法對董監事及經理\r\n人課以無限清償責任，這樣特有的高度監理法規，提供了保險\r\n研究文獻上檢視公司治理結構與保險公司風險決策行為關係之\r\n特殊研究環境。本研究以代理理論與公司治理相關文獻為基\r\n礎，探討保險業之代理問題，及其對保險業經營業務上風險決\r\n策行為的影響。本研究蒐集我國人壽保險與產物保險公司2000\r\n年至2002 年的公司治理結構變數，採用迴歸模型分析公司治理\r\n對保險公司整體營運、業務與投資等風險決策行為之影響。實\r\n證結果發現，保險公司股東投票權偏離現金流量權的幅度以及\r\n股權集中度對於保險業風險決策行為有正向影響；而現金流量\r\n請求權、董事會規模、獨立董事、總經理兼任董事長等變數，\r\n對於風險決策行為有負向影響。另外，內部經理人持股率與投\r\n資風險決策行為呈現倒U 型關係。

This paper investigates the impacts of corporate governance\r\nstructures on risk-taking behavior in the insurance industry. The\r\ncorporate governance structure of the insurance industry in Taiwan,\r\nwhich holds board members fully responsible for cases of\r\nbankruptcy, offers an interesting environment in which to explore\r\nits unique regulatory impact on insurers’ risk-taking behavior.\r\nEvidence shows that even under sticker regulatory rules, corporate\r\ngovernance still plays an important role in influencing risk taking by\r\nboth property-liability and life insurers in Taiwan. Specifically,\r\ndeviations of voting rights from cash-flow rights and ownership\r\nconcentration have positive impacts on risk taking, whereas cashflow\r\nrights, board size, board independence, and CEO duality have\r\nnegative impacts on insurers’ risk taking. The relationship between\r\nrisk taking and insider ownership is inversely U-shaped.