Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54881
題名: 不完全資訊和雙重改變下的分群模型
Grouping with Heterogeneity: Incomplete Information and Double Mutation
作者: 邱彥閔
貢獻者: 莊委桐
邱彥閔
關鍵詞: 分群模型
異質人群
不完全資訊
改變
隨機潛能
長期均衡
grouping
heterogenous population
incopmplete information
mutation
stochastic potential
equilibria in long term
日期: 2011
上傳時間: 30-Oct-2012
摘要: 本文首先構建了在完全資訊下的異質分群模型。當玩家可以觀察其他玩家的類型,則均衡必定是非隔離的:大多數玩家將無意移動,這是因為他們的夥伴可以為他們帶來最好的報酬。均衡狀態將會是一個有效率的狀態。\n    然後,我們構建另一個分組模型:訊息不完全和雙重改變下的分群模型。結果表明,雖然非隔離的均衡有可能是在短期的穩定均衡,但只有隔離的均衡狀態可以在長期維持穩定。這是因為在長期下,大多數非隔離狀態可以輕易地切換到隔離狀態的緣故。
This paper first constructs a grouping model with heterogeneous population under the setting of complete information. When player can observe other`s type, the result isnon-segregation: most players have no intention to move and they can match with the one who brings them the best payoff in the original group. The equilibrium state is always efficient.\n We then construct another grouping model with incomplete information and double mutation. The result shows that, although non-segregation equilibria may emerge as stable equilibria in the short run, only segregation equilibria can be stochastically stable in the long run. This is because most of non-segregated states can switch to the others by the same re-sistance and some of them can easily switch to segregated state, but it is hard to switch back.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
99258018
100
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099258018
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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