仿冒查緝與外國市場之關稅連結

Abstract

在國際貿易日趨活絡的情況下，智慧財產權受侵害之問題，已成為持續關注的問題。本文探討當智慧財產權等無形資產為外國正版商所擁有時，外國政府透過關稅連結下，本國政府將如何制定國內的仿冒查緝率。透過本研究我們發現當外國市場規模較小時，本國政府會將仿冒查緝率定為零；當外國市場規模夠大時，本國政府會將仿冒查緝率定為查緝率上限；而當外國市場規模介於前兩種情形之間時，仿冒查緝率有可能為零或查緝率上限。

Because of intense international trade, infringement of intellectual property has caught the persistent attentions. This paper analyzes how domestic government decides the optimal enforcement rate through tariff link when the intellectual property is held by a foreign company. We find the domestic government would set the enforcement rate to zero when the foreign market size is small. On the contrary, when the foreign market size is large, the domestic government would raise the enforcement rate to the upper limit. Besides, when the foreign market size is moderate, the enforcement rate would be zero or at the upper limit.