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Title: Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy
Authors: Wang,Jue-Shyan;Lin, Mei-Yin
Contributors: 政大財政系
Keywords: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium;Sequential Equilibrium
Date: 2012-09
Issue Date: 2013-08-22 13:44:09 (UTC+8)
Abstract: A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.
Relation: Modern Economy, 3(5), 653-657
Data Type: article
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Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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