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Title: On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Authors: Tsai,Tsung-Sheng;Yang,C. C.
Contributors: 政大財政系
Date: 2010-11
Issue Date: 2013-08-26 16:11:01 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's (American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence's signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay.
Relation: International Economic Review, 51(4), 959-979
Data Type: article
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Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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