Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Minimum Winning verus Oversized Coalitions in Public Finance: The Role of Uncertainty
Authors: Tsai,Tsung-Sheng;Yang,C. C.
Contributors: 政大財政系
Date: 2010-02
Issue Date: 2013-08-26 16:11:03 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This paper extends Persson et al.’s (J Polit Econ 108:1121–1161, 2000) simple legislature in the context of public finance with certainty to uncertainty. In our uncertain world, oversized coalitions (OSCs) as well as minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) may arise in equilibrium, and the agenda setter’s proposed policy may fail to receive a majority support. This is in marked contrast to the certain world, in which only MWCs can arise in equilibrium and the agenda setter’s proposal never fails to pass. When OSCs arise, we show that both public good provision and redistribution are likely to achieve their first-best solution, even if the legislature is simple.
Relation: Social Choice and Welfare, 34(2), 345-361
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
345361.pdf216KbAdobe PDF1049View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing