Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/59532


Title: 不同國家的反托拉斯法對於卡特爾行為的影響
The Impact of Different Antitrust Laws on the Actions of Cartels
Authors: 陳宜卲
Chen, Yi Shao
Contributors: 王智賢
Wang, Jue Shyan
陳宜卲
Chen, Yi Shao
Keywords: 反托拉斯
卡特爾
寬恕政策
貝氏 Nash 均衡
Antitrust
Cartel
Leniency Policy
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Date: 2012
Issue Date: 2013-09-02 17:22:21 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 反托拉斯法在近期以來已受到越來越多的關注與重視,而為了全球經濟的穩定與公平,近年來有越來越多的國家採用反托拉斯法裡面的寬恕政策來控制企業壟斷的行為。本文利用賽局理論的模型來分析在不同國家的反托拉斯法之下會產生的均衡對應為何,並且我們以Blum et al. (2008) 的模型加以修改來分析在不同寬恕政策的機制之下,對於廠商們壟斷行為的可能影響。我們研究發現,對於壟斷行為的罰款金額大小會影響壟斷行為的存在與否,而各個國家對於壟斷行為的合法性認定也會是一個非常重要的因素,我們研究得出的結果是,當一個國家的主管機關要求廠商一定要事先提出壟斷行為(卡特爾聯盟)申請,才能夠使聯合行為合法的時候,廠商們會傾向決定不要採取聯合壟斷的行為。
The issues about antitrust laws are getting much attention nowadays. And many countries over the world adopt leniency policies to control the actions of cartels. We used a game-theoretical model to discuss the equilibrium of cartels under different antitrust laws. And we modify the model of Blum et al. (2008) to analyze the equilibriums of firms under the different mechanisms of leniency policies. We find out that the value of fine will affect the existence of a cartel, and the recognitions of legitimacies for cartels are important as well. When the antitrust authorities ask firms to propose appliances in advance to let the cartels be legal, firms would incline not to become a cartel. It’s quite different from the other mechanism which firms can confess to the antitrust authorities after they’ve already become a cartel.
Reference: Aubert, C., P. Rey, and W. E. Kovacic (2006). “The Impact of Leniency and Whistle-blowing Programs on Cartels,”International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 1241-1266.
Bigoni, M., S. Fridolfsson, C. Coq, and G. Spagnolo (2012). “Fines, Leniency, and Rewards in Antitrust,” Journal of Economics, 43, 368–390.
Blum, U., N. Steinat and M. Veltins (2008). “On the Rationale of Leniency Programs: A Game-theoretical Analysis,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 209-229.
Brisset, K., and L. Thomas (2004). “Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions,” European Journal of Law and Economics, 17, 5-19.
Chavda, A. and M. Jegers (2007). “The Effects of Leniency Programs and Fines on Cartel Stability,” Metroeconomica, 58, 231-243.
Ellis, C., and W. Wilson (2003). “Cartels, Price-fixing, and Corporate Leniency Policy: What Doesn’t Kill Us Makes Us Stronger. Manuscript, University of Oregon.
Hinloopen, H. (2003). “An Economic Analysis of Leniency Programs in Antitrust Law,” De Economist, 151, 415-432.
Ishibashi, I., and D. Shimizu (2010). “Collusive Behavior under a Leniency Program,” Journal of Economics, 101, 169-183.
Motta, M. and M. Polo (2003). “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 347–379.
Spagnolo, G., “Divide et Impera (2004). “Optimal Deterrence Mechanisms Against Cartels (and Organized Crime),” FEEM working paper, Milano.
Description: 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
100255018
101
Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100255018
Data Type: thesis
Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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