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Title: Information Leakage in Innovation Outsourcing
Authors: Ho,Shirley J.
Contributors: 政大經濟系
Date: 2009-08
Issue Date: 2013-09-16 17:26:59 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.
Relation: R&D Management, 39(5), 431-443
Data Type: article
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