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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60938
題名: | Information Leakage in Innovation Outsourcing | 作者: | Ho,Shirley J. | 貢獻者: | 政大經濟系 | 日期: | 八月-2009 | 上傳時間: | 16-九月-2013 | 摘要: | This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor. | 關聯: | R&D Management, 39(5), 431-443 | 資料類型: | article | DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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