Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60938
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor | 政大經濟系 | en_US |
dc.creator | Ho,Shirley J. | en_US |
dc.date | 2009-08 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-09-16T09:26:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-09-16T09:26:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013-09-16T09:26:59Z | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60938 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 231189 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
dc.relation | R&D Management, 39(5), 431-443 | en_US |
dc.title | Information Leakage in Innovation Outsourcing | en_US |
dc.type | article | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x | en_US |
dc.doi.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x | en_US |
item.languageiso639-1 | en_US | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.grantfulltext | restricted | - |
item.openairetype | article | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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j.1467.pdf | 225.77 kB | Adobe PDF2 | View/Open |
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