Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: Fishery Subsidies, Illegal Fuel Trading, and Conservation
Authors: Hung,Chih-Ming;Weng,Yungho
Contributors: 政大經濟系
Keywords: Fuel subsidy;illegal fuel trading;conservation
Date: 2012-10
Issue Date: 2013-09-16 17:35:47 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This article incorporates illegal fuel trading behavior to examine the effects of changes in the fishery subsidy rate, detection effort, and fish price on the level of fishing, illegal fuel trading, and fish biomass. The corresponding effects on the fisherman's profits and the profits of the oil company that supplies the raw fuel to the fishery are also examined. The findings are, first, that the subsidy policy benefits the oil company, but its effects on the fisherman are ambiguous. Second, an increase in detection effort leads to less illegal activity in relation to fuel trading and more legal fishing resulting in less fish biomass. The detection policy hurts the oil company, the fisherman who engages in fuel trading, and resource conservation. Finally, an increase in fish price leads to a similar result as an increase in detection effort, but the effects on the fisherman's profits are reversed. The oil company also benefits from increasing fish price.
Relation: Marine Resource Economics, 27(3), 253-265
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[經濟學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
253265.pdf5358KbAdobe PDF909View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing