Financial Restraint, Capital Investment, and Economic Growth

Abstract

本文探討政府金融約束（financial restraint）對資本投資及經濟成長的影響。為了刺激投資，傳統的凱因斯理論建議政府應採取金融約束政策，限制利率低於均衡水準。然而，近期許多國家都根據McKinnon and Shaw的學說，採取金融自由化政策。本文設計一個理論模型，納入了傳統凱因斯理論的看法及McKinnon and Shaw的學說，重新探討政府金融約束政策對資本投資、經濟成長與社會福利的影響。模型的結果發現了政府金融約束政策（管制讓利率低於均衡水準）對於資本投資有正、反兩股力量，隱含存在了一個最適的利率水準，可以極大化經濟成長。我們也發現了極大化社會福利的一個利率水準（也是低於均衡利率水準）。這些結論與最近一些實證文獻所發現的結論－溫和的政府金融約束政策有利於金融發展與經濟成長－一致。

We examine the effects of a government policy of financial restraint on capital investment and economic growth. To promote capital investment, conventional wisdom has long suggested that the government adopts a policy of financial restraint that keeps the interest rate below the equilibrium level. In contrast, many countries have recently adopted the policy of financial liberalization according to the McKinnon-Shaw thesis. This paper re-examines the effects of financial restraint by developing a model that incorporates both the conventional wisdom and the McKinnon-Shaw thesis. We find that there are optimal levels of financial restraints measured by a lending rate ceiling below the equilibrium level which maximizes economic growth and social welfare, respectively. Our results are consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that a mild financial restraint is beneficial to capital investment and economic growth.