日本金融改革之分析

Abstract

日本自從一九九一年泡沫經濟破滅以來經濟即陷入停滯的狀態，至今仍尚未有恢復的跡象。在這七年當中，日本政府實施七次刺激經濟景氣對策，結果成效皆相當有限。去年亞洲金融風暴，更把日本長期以來隱藏在高度經濟成長背後，派系－企業－金融機構共生的金融體制弱點完全顯露出來。日本政府在今 (一九九八)年四月一日實施金融改革及行政革新對策，其中包括解除外匯管制，金融資訊透明化的措施，希望以金融體系自由化來帶動經濟的活絡。本文的主要目的是探討日本在過去七年當中所施行的經濟對策為何無法產生效能，以及這次金融改革背後的政經意涵。

This article explores the reasons behind the stagnation of the Japanese economy since 1991. During the past forty years, Japan’s economic development strategies were state-led, market-conforming, administrationally-guided, dependent on very limited foreign capital. A key characteristic of this system was the formation of a unique enterprise-bank relationship. In order to promote economic growth, the government allowed banks to maintain a low-interest policy enabling enterprises to easily borrow large amounts of money. However, enterprises often reinvested this money in such non-productive sectors as the stock market and real estate. When the economy began to slow, Japanese banks thus began to pile up huge debts. To solve these problems the Japan government has implemented seven “economic stimulation packages” between 1991 to 1997. Finally, in April 1998 a new financial reform program was put into practice, aspects of which include ending foreign exchange restrictions and making banking information more transparent. This article analyzes why the seven previous packages failed and discusses the political-economic ramifications of the new one.