國際貨幣基金的制約條件、執行成效與政經效應

Abstract

成立於一九四四年的布列敦森林機制，以國際貨幣基金及世界銀行作為其執行單位。其中，國際貨幣基金的角色主要在維繫後金融與貨幣秩序，期望能在穩定的匯率秩序下，帶領各國復甦其經濟，以促進國際貿易的推動，提昇各國人民的福祉。國際貨幣基金在會員國發生國際收支困難時，可以提供暫時的融資，協助該國解決收支赤字的問題。在美國的主導下，國際貨幣基金對於會員國提供融資援助時，必須附帶執行制約條件，以確保國際貨幣基金資源得以不斷循環使用。美國透過制約條件中的緊縮方案與自由化政策，成功地將貨幣主義學派的觀念推銷至全球，並促使取多中低度開發國家開放市場。不過，國際貨幣基金的融資計畫卻面臨兩難的局面：包裹著制約條件的國際融資行動，一方面間接維護了美國及西歐、日本等主要工業國家官方及私人商業銀行的債權，但另一方面，也使得許多原本就面臨國際收支困難的國家，遭受到更嚴中的經濟衰退與政治不安。雖然如此，在國際社會尚為能創造另一個有別於現存的機制之前，發生經濟困難的會員國卻也只能別無選擇地接受國際貨幣基金的制約條件。

The Bretton Woods Institution, established in 1944, gave the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Band a mandate to enforce their institutional principles. The role of the IMF lies in maintaining the post-war financial and currency orders. The IMF if expected both to lead member countries in simulating their economies as well as to facilitate international trade and enhance people’s welfare. The IMF assists member countries suffering international payment problems by solving deficit problems via temporary financing. Due to insistence from the United States, the IMF must enforce conditionality while offering financing assistance so that the IMF can ensure the revolving use of its resources. At the same time, the United States has also successfully marketed concepts of monetarism all around the would and urged many developing countries to open their domestic markets by following the austerity and liberalization policies of IMF conditionality. However, the conditionality of the IMF’s financing program has created a dilemma. On the one hand, the international financing program has protected creditor tights in both official states and Japan. On the other hand, the program worsened economic malaise and political instability in the deficit countries. Nevertheless, as long as the international society is unable to create a mechanism different from the IMF, these deficit countries have no other choice but to accept IMF conditionality.