台灣地區「分立政府」與「一致政府」之研究：以1986年至2001年地方政府府會關係為例

Abstract

近來，行政部門與立法部門分屬不同政黨所掌握的「分立政府」(divided government)現象，已成為我國各級政府的常態“與此同時，分立政府對於體制運作所造成的影響，似乎亦逐漸展現。鑑此，本文試圖引用分立政府與「一致政府」(unified government)的架構，以1986年至2001年期間，23個地方政府（包含21個縣市與北高直轄市）的「縣市政府所提法案之審議情形」、「縣市政府年度預算刪減之幅度」，以及「縣市議會通過法案的情形」府會互動面向，進行「橫切面時間序列」（time-series cross-section，簡稱為TSCS）模型的實證研究。分析結果顯示，相較於一致政府而言，在縣市層級分立政府之中，對於政府法案之審議、預算刪減幅度，以及「立法生產力」(legislation productivity)等方面，確實產生程度不一的影響。尤其，當民進黨籍縣市首長，面對國民黨掌握過半數的議會時，預算刪減幅度往往較高，立法生產力亦隨之降低。此外，縣市首長是否具有連任意圖，對於政府法案之審議、預算刪減幅度，以及立法生產力，亦有顯著的影響。在結論中，本文認為分立政府應可成為研究我國政治發展的新取向，並提出未來相關研究的方向與建議。

Divided party control of the executive and legislative branches has become the normal condition of Taiwan`s politics. At a concrete level, it is always argued that divided government tends to generate such executive-legislature predicaments as policy gridlock, stalemate, and inefficiency. Using time-series cross-section (TSCS) models, we empirically examine the executive-legislature relations in terms of "the legislative enactments proposed by the executive branch," "the reduction proportions of budgets," and "the passage of laws in the legislature" at Taiwan`s 23 local governments from 1986 to 2001. The findings indicate that unified versus divided party control of the government exerts an important influence on the three indicators of executive-legislature relations. It is especially salient that when the Democratic Progressive Party`s (DPP) executives facing the Kuomintang (KMT) overwhelmingly controlled the legislatures, the reduction proportions of local-government budgets tend to increase, while the legislation productivities decrease compared to under a unified KMT-controlled government. The results also reveal that the reelection intentions of executive incumbents emerge as a statistically significant determinant of the three indicators of executive-legislature relations. We conclude with the limitations of this study and remark an the possible approaches for further research on divided government in Taiwan.