鄰避性環境衝突管理的制度與策略─以理性選擇與交易成本理論分析六輕建廠及拜耳投資案

Abstract

民主化以來，我國因環境意識提高，公權力強力介入環境糾紛的可行性大幅降低，導致鄰避性（NIMBY, Not In My Back Yard）環境衝突案件層出不窮。本文首先介紹鄰避性環境衝突的一些特質，並以交易成本的理論，分析制度在此間可扮演的角色，同時檢視國外在處理類似情境時所做的制度化之努力。為深入解釋台灣民主化進程所產生的特殊問題，本文針對分析台塑於利澤與麥寮之六輕設廠及拜耳於台中港地區的投資案中所面臨的鄰避衝突，作情境與策略之分析，以印證「適度以制度與策略地提昇政治參與及對話，始能成功地控制環境議題的『泛政治』化趨勢」之命題，並做成政策上的建議。

Taiwan’s economic development has been plagued by the NIMBY (Not In MY Back Yard) protests. Under democratization, the government can no longer rely purely on its authority to preclude grass-roots protests against the preemption of locally unwanted land uses. Neither has the government built up systematical channels for sufficient public discourses on siting decisions, as a democratic system normally allows, nor has it created credible mechanisms to solve disputes. Mainly through rational choice and transaction cost theory, this paper examines the institutional deficits of Taiwan in dealing with NIMY environmental conflicts. It analyzes the situational and strategic factors that had interacted with existing institutions in three cases–the Sixth Naphtha Cracker Plants in Li-che (I-lan) and Mai-liao (Yun-lin) respectively, and Bayer in Tai-chung Harbor area. It argues that promoting political discourses in earlier stage of citing decisions is just the way to control undue politicizing activities by local elite soliciting private selective interests. This paper concludes by discussing some policy implications of important findings.