到不了的安全港?―歐洲共同體技術授權豁免法之研究

Abstract

首先，本文探究禁止聯合行為之立法目的，並分析歐洲共同體條約第81條之規範重點（涉及聯合行為之禁止與例外規定）。其次，本研究探討歐洲共同體技術授權豁免法之適用範圍與主要規定，以系統性的分析方法，全面評析相關法理以及學界和實務界之見解。根據該法之規定，無論競爭者間或非競爭者間之技術授權協議，即便協議內容未含聯合訂價、割裂市場或限制產出等應禁止之重大限制，契約商品或服務之市場占有率尚須低於百分之二十（競爭者間之技術授權協議）或百分之三十（非競爭者間之技術授權協議）之比例，方能享有自動豁免。此等關於市占率之限制過於嚴苛；立法者似假設，技術授權契約當事人若掌握較高之市占率，渠等終將挾其市場力量，破壞特定市場之秩序，進而侵害消費者權益。然而，本研究顯示，此項假設既非奠基於任何經濟學研究成果，亦非歐盟司法實務之見解，立基點極為薄弱。準此，本文建議刪除契約商品或服務市占率之相關規定，保留禁止重大限制之條文，使技術授權協議豁免與否之判斷，全然以契約當事人市場行為之正面效益與負面效益為衡量準據，避免成功之研發者因高市占率而喪失自動獲免之機會，未蒙其研發成功之利，反受其阻礙。

This Article makes a critical examination of the 2004 Technology Transfer Regulation. Compared to the 1996 Technology Transfer Regulation containing both a blacklist and a white list, the blacklist approach of the 2004 Regulation leaves more flexibility for the parties to design a licence to their commercial needs. However, the thresholds of market share are too low, rendering the 2004 Regulation tougher than the 1996 Regulation. The officials who drafted the 2004 Regulation have noted that this legislation has an economic approach, and some practicing lawyers note that it takes an effects-based approach. Nonetheless, little economic investigations have been carried out in order to set appropriate thresholds of market share. The EU legislator should abolish the current thresholds of market share and make much higher ceilings. Even if a technology transfer agreement does not infringe Article 81 EC, crucial intellectual property rights relating to the agreement may lead to a dominant position and the duty to supply or license its competitors under Article 82 EC. The task of raising the market-share thresholds should be completed following the collection and reviews of relevant investigations by economists. Otherwise, the safe harbour provided by the 2004 Regulation may be an area in which only a few undertakings are able to reach.