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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70682
題名: | The Gap between Mind and World in Mind and World Remains | 作者: | 林從一 Lin, Chung-I. |
貢獻者: | 哲學系 | 關鍵詞: | McDowell; Objectivity;Conceptuality of Experience; False Experience | 日期: | 2013 | 上傳時間: | 20-Oct-2014 | 摘要: | In Mind and World, McDowell endorses: empirical thoughts should be justified, ultimately, by things they are about; and, that empirical thoughts are immediately about their ultimate justifiers. But, it also holds two other views: first, as we relate our empirical judgments to their credentials, we ultimately rely on experience, despite its fallibility; second, our empirical judgments are about things in the external world. These views appear inconsistent with one another. McDowell’s way of accommodating the seeming inconsistency appeals to the idea of conceptuality of experience and the holism of the conceptual. Mainly by an argument from false experience, I demonstrate that the conceptual resources relevant to McDowell’s idea of the conceptuality of experience fall short of delivering the accommodation he promises. | 關聯: | Open Journal of Philosophy,3(2), 278-284 | 資料類型: | article | DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.32044 |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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