Asymmetric timeliness of earnings and board of directors remuneration plans

Abstract

The present study investigates the effect of directors` profit sharing remuneration on the quality of earnings-timely recognition of economic losses. Conservatism manifested by the differential speed in the recognition of economic gains and losses could counteract managers` incentives to overstate firm performance and mitigate the agency problem between management and shareholders. As directors` pay is directly tied to bottom-line earnings, we find that firms with higher directors` remuneration are associated with less conservative earnings after controlling for leverage, firm growth and corporate governance structure.

本文主要探討公司依照公司章程盈餘分配比率支付董監酬勞是否會影響會計盈餘的品質。會計盈餘品質主要以會計的穩健保守原則程度來衡量。會計原則中的穩健保守主義要求會計盈餘對於市場認列好消息的即時性會比認列壞消息的即時性慢，此種不對稱將可以防止經理人盈餘操控的動機，降低管理者和股東間的代理成本。本文發現由於董監酬勞金額的決定是依照損益表淨損益的一定比率，董監事將缺乏強大誘因提升會計品質，本文在控制公司負債比、成長性以及其他公司治理變數後，發現董監酬勞越高的公司其會計保守性越低。