Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: From Predator to Debtor: Soft Budget Constraint and the Semi-Planned Administration in Rural China
Authors: 劉雅靈
Liu, Yia-Ling
Contributors: 社會系
Keywords: Budget deficits;Public finance;Grass roots movement;Bailouts;Public administration;Deficit financing
Date: 2012-05
Issue Date: 2014-12-24 10:16:35 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This article explores the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration under which the grassroots role of debtors has loomed large and made possible the transition of grassroots cadres from predators to debtors. The institutional features of the semi-panned administration -- the institution of target responsibility, the legacy of cost shifting, and the paternalistic care provided by the socialist state -- together with related policy measures explain the pathology of budget deficits and debt problems at the grassroots level across rural China. An investigation into the public finances of grassroots governments in Wenzhou, Wuxi, and Jianshi illuminates how the Chinese semi-planned administration has shaped individual cadres' calculations and behavior, perpetuated their irresponsible spending, and reproduced local soft budget constraints. This article argues that without an outright revamping of the institutions of the Chinese semi-planned administration, the current practice of simply writing off rural debt through financial bailouts perpetuates soft budget constraints across the countryside.
Relation: Modern China,38(3), 308-345
Data Type: article
DOI 連結:
Appears in Collections:[社會學系] 期刊論文

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
383345.pdf325KbAdobe PDF1031View/Open

All items in 學術集成 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

社群 sharing