Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73462


Title: 論中共談判「原則」之策略運用:從簽訂「全面禁止核試條約」為例
Other Titles: China's Negotiating Principles and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiation
Authors: 張廖年仲
Chang Liao, Nien-chung
Contributors: 東亞所
Keywords: 中共談判原則;不首先使用核武;不對非核國使用核武;全面禁止核試條約;和平核爆
China's negotiating principles;Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;Negative Security Assurances;No First Use;Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Date: 2004-09
Issue Date: 2015-02-11 14:29:06 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 提出原則是中共談判風格的一大特色,本文分析中共在[全面禁止核試條約]的談判中, 對於[不首先使用核武]、[不對非核國使用核武]以及[和平核爆]原則的運用。本文的研究顯示:中共的談判原則並非堅持不變, 必要時可以擱置, 但是會用來交換其他的條件或提出保留的立場;中共會以原則作為拖延談判的手段, 待時機成熟或達成其它的目標後,再擱置原則使談判完成; 而中共的談判原則往往帶有道德的訴求, 使其具有策略上的效果。
China's negotiating style is characterized by proposing principles for negotiation Characteruses. This essay analyzes how China bargained in the process of the "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" negotiation its principles such as "Not First Use," "Negative Security Assurances," and "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions." The result shows: first, China did not insist on its negotiating principles persistently, because those principles could be served for trade-offs or reserving positions; second, China could use its principles to delay the negotiation in order to achieve other goals, and then disregard the principles to complete the negotiation as planned; finally, China linked its negotiating principles with moral appeals for tactical effects.
Relation: 中國大陸研究, 47(3), 169-188
Data Type: article
Appears in Collections:[東亞研究所 ] 期刊論文
[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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