「軟紀律約束」－中共強化監督之政改的內在限制

Abstract

本文提出「軟紀律約束」，解釋為何權力集中的中共黨國體制對各級幹部難以約束。本文指出若要改變此現象，須進行朝向「權力分立」的政改。本文檢視胡錦濤任內所提出「黨內監督條例」、「審計風暴」、「問責制」和「輿論監督」四項改革案例，發現雖中共已意識到應採行權力分立，但若如此勢必破壞中共體制的「民主集中制」、「集體領導」、或「以黨領政」等核心原則，因而此種改革勢將非常困難。本文認為，「軟紀律約束」終將限制中共從「後極權威權政體」向民主之轉化。

This paper raises the concept of “soft disciplinary constraint” to explainwhy the party-state of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces difficulty to constrain the power of its leading cadres. This paper points out that reforms directed to “separation of powers” need to be taken to overcome this problem.After examining four reform cases taken by Hu Jintao, this paper finds that although the CCP has also come to such an understanding, it still cannot fully implement such reforms, because to really have separation of powers would inevitably destroy some of its basic organizational principles such as “democratic centralism,” “collective leadership,” or “party leadership over the state.” This paper argues that the “soft disciplinary constraint” will thus become the most important internal constraint for CCP’s democratic transition as a “post-totalitarian authoritarian regime.”