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|Other Titles:||Who Governs? The Dynamics of Policy-Making in China: The Case of Antitrust Law|
who governs;policy process;Antitrust Law;bureaucratic competition
|Issue Date:||2015-02-11 14:54:57 (UTC+8)|
For the past half century, “who governs?” is widely considered as one of the great theoretical debates in political science and policy studies. Most literature on policy-making in the communist system has highlighted the monolithic and top-down nature of the process. The prime concern has been with the monolith and its totality and the actions of a cabal of key leaders who transmit policy direction through the party to be implemented by a subservient bureaucracy. The reforms that began at the end of 1970s created opportunities for unprecedented scholarly access to understand the policy processes and “who governs?” in China. Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy has moved dramatically away from the model of socialist planning and into a new world of market forces. During this time, the CCP has made a wide-ranging effort to reform the institutions of economic governance. The party is no longer able to perform the vital role of integrating the bureaucracy to improve both formulation and implementation of policy. This article will illustrate the legislative process of the Antitrust Law to prove that the bureaucratic structure in China is highly fragmented, making consensus-building central and the policy process protracted, disjointed, and incremental. It offers us a viewpoint to explore the policy making and the impact of bureaucratic competition in contemporary China.
|Relation:||中國大陸研究 , 53(1) , 35-62|
|Appears in Collections:||[Graduate Institute of East Asia Studies ] Periodical Articles|
[Mainland China Studies] Journal Articles
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