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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/7505
題名: | The Impact of Share Holding and Ability of Managers on The Firm Value of State-Owned Enterprises in China - An Application of Financial Agency Theory | 作者: | 廖四郎;蔡揚宗 ;張敏蕾 Liao, Szu-Lang ; Tsay, Jimmy Y.T. ; Chang, Ming-Lei |
關鍵詞: | agency relationship; state-owned enterprise; shareholding; compensation surplus | 日期: | 2002 | 上傳時間: | 14-Nov-2008 | 摘要: | This study aims to investigate the corruption and collusion problems occurring\r\nin the reforms of state-owned enterprises in China, and to analyze how this problem\r\naffects the performance of state firms. Using the idea of principal-supervisor-agent\r\nrelationships, we analyze the decay of officials control over state-owned enterprises\r\nresulting from the change that employees, managers and the public are now allowed\r\nto hold shares of state-owned enterprises, and they can claim the residual rights of\r\nthe enterprises. From our analysis, the corruption and collusion between officials\r\nand managers may not become less serious. The performances of state-owned\r\nenterprises will not be improved even after the introduction of the shareholder system.\r\nWe use a game-theoretical model involving public, government officials and\r\nenterprise managers, focusing on political considerations to study the effect of\r\nownership structure of state-owned enterprises. | 關聯: | 中山管理評論, 10, 3-39 | 資料類型: | article |
Appears in Collections: | 期刊論文 |
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