勞動逃漏稅、金融雙元體系與經濟成長

劉珈伶; Liu, Jia Ling

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76931

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.advisor	洪福聲	zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor	Hung, Fu Sheng	en_US
dc.contributor.author	劉珈伶	zh_TW
dc.contributor.author	Liu, Jia Ling	en_US
dc.creator	劉珈伶	zh_TW
dc.creator	Liu, Jia Ling	en_US
dc.date	2015	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-27T03:33:51Z	-
dc.date.available	2015-07-27T03:33:51Z	-
dc.date.issued	2015-07-27T03:33:51Z	-
dc.identifier	G0102258033	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76931	-
dc.description	碩士	zh_TW
dc.description	國立政治大學	zh_TW
dc.description	經濟學系	zh_TW
dc.description	102258033	zh_TW
dc.description.abstract	本文將內生經濟成長模型與逃漏稅結合，並依據現存文獻的看法，因地下經濟較地上經濟易於逃漏稅，故勞動者會有誘因從事地下經濟活動，因此本研究將勞動者從事地下經濟的行為視為逃漏稅，其中，地下經濟的報酬即為代表性個人在經濟體系中隱匿所得的部分。模型也考量金融雙元體系的存在，以探討在不同的金融發展程度下，政府應採取的逃漏稅最適稽查政策。代表性個人可以透過地上及地下經濟活動的投入，賺取不同的報酬，並可藉由地上金融部門儲蓄以累積資本。另外，政府可透過逃漏稅稽查政策以影響代表性個人投入於地下經濟活動的時間比例(即逃漏稅比例)，並進一步影響地上經濟的勞動市場均衡。透過本研究的數值模擬，可發現對於金融發展程度較低的國家而言，政府應採取較寬鬆的逃漏稅稽查政策，允許經濟體系存在較嚴重的逃漏稅及較大規模的地下經濟部門。相對地，對於金融發展程度較高的國家而言，政府應採取較嚴峻的查稅政策，故經濟體系存在較輕微的逃漏稅及較小規模的地下經濟部門。本研究也進行了比較靜態分析。	zh_TW
dc.description.tableofcontents	中文摘要 I\n目錄 II\n表目錄 III\n圖目錄 IV\n第一章緒論 1\n第一節研究動機與目的 1\n第二節研究方法與架構 2\n第二章文獻回顧 3\n第一節經濟成長模型的演進 3\n第二節逃漏稅的相關文獻 5\n第三章模型設定 9\n第一節地上經濟與地下經濟敘述 9\n第二節逃漏稅、政府稽查與經濟成長 19\n第四章數值模擬 23\n第一節特定金融發展程度下，對各變數的影響 23\n第二節比較靜態分析 28\n第五章結論 36\n參考文獻 37\n附錄一 40\n附錄二 42\n附錄三 47	zh_TW
dc.format.extent	1415391 bytes	-
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	-
dc.source.uri	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258033	en_US
dc.subject	逃漏稅	zh_TW
dc.subject	金融雙元體系	zh_TW
dc.subject	地下經濟	zh_TW
dc.subject	經濟成長	zh_TW
dc.title	勞動逃漏稅、金融雙元體系與經濟成長	zh_TW
dc.title	Tax Evasion of Labor Incomes, Financial Dualism, and Economic Growth	en_US
dc.type	thesis	en
dc.relation.reference	中文文獻：\n[ 1 ] 陳明郎(1999)，「經濟成長」，華泰文化事業有限公司。\n[ 2 ] 黃仁德、羅時萬(2001)，「現代經濟成長理論」，華泰文化事業有限公司。 \n[ 3 ] 莊希豐(1998)，「政府支出與內生化經濟成長-應用於臺灣經濟」，淡江人文社會期刊創刊號，頁241-267。\n英文文獻：\n[ 4 ] Allingham, M., and A. Sandmo (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical \n Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.\n[ 5 ] Andreoni, J., B., B., Erard, and J. Feinstern (1998), “Tax Compliance,” Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 818-860.\n[ 6 ] Barro, R. J. (1990), “Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous\n Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(S5): 103-125.\n[ 7 ] Beck, T., A. L. Chen, and A. U. Yue, (2014), “Why Do Firms Evade Taxes?\n The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach,” Journal of\n Finance, 69, 763-817.\n[ 8 ] Blackburn, K., N. Bose, and S. Capassom (2012), “Tax evasion, the \n Underground Economy and Financial Development,” Journal of Economic \n Behavior & Organization, 83, 243– 253.\n[ 9 ] Bose, N. and R. Cothren (1996), “Equilibrium Loan Contracts and Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 38, 363-376.\n[ 10 ] Bose, N. (2002), “Inflation, the Credit Market and Economic Growth,” Oxford Economic Papers, 54, 412-434.\n[ 11 ] Chen, B. L. (2003), “Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth,” \n Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(2), 381-403.\n[ 12 ] Demirguc-Kunt, A., L. Laeven, and R. Levine (2004), “Regulations, Market\n Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation,” Journal of\n Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 593-622.\n[ 13 ] Frederiksen, A., E. Graversen, and N. Smith (2005), “Tax Evasion and Work \n in the Underground Sector, ” Labour Economics, 12, 613-618.\n[ 14 ] Hung, F. S. (2015), “Tax Evasion, Financial Dualism, and Economic \n Growth,” Academia Economic Papers, 43:2, 175-213.\n[ 15 ] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991), “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,” MIT Press, Cambridge. \n[ 16 ] Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009), “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(7), 855-866.\n[ 17 ] Kan, K. (2000), “Informal Capital Sources and Household Investment: \n Evidence from Taiwan,” Journal of Development Economics, 62, 209-232.\n[ 18 ] Lin,W. Z. and C. C. Yang (2001), “A Dynamic Portfolio Choice Model of Tax\nEvasion: Comparative Statics of Tax Rates and its Implication for Economic\nGrowth,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 1827-40.\n[ 19 ] Roubini, N. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995), “A Growth Model of Inflation, Tax Evasion, and Financial Repression,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 275-301.\n[ 20 ] Romer, P. M. (1986), “Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(5), 1002-1037.\n[ 21 ] Romer, P. M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), s71-s102.\n[ 22 ] Solow, R. (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” \n Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65-94.\n[ 23 ] Schneider, E. and D. Enste (2002), “The Shadow Economy: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Studies, and Political Implications,” Cambridge, UK:\n Cambridge University Press.\n[ 24 ] Taylor, L. (1983), “Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable Models for the\n Third World,” New York: Basic Books.\n[ 25 ] van Wijnbergen, S. (1983), “Interest Rate Management in LDC’s,” Journal\n of Monetary Economics, 12, 433-52.\n[ 26 ] Young, A. (1991), “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,” NBER Working Papers, 3577.	zh_TW
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item.cerifentitytype	Publications	-
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