Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76932
題名: 台灣創投基金對於新創公司 長期表現的影響
The Effect of Venture Capitals on the Long-term Performance of Start-ups
作者: 王家唯
Wang, Chia Wei
貢獻者: 李文傑<br>王信實
Lee, Wen Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn Shyr
王家唯
Wang, Chia Wei
關鍵詞: 創業投資基金
聲譽
國際化
政治連結
初次公開發行
長期表現
國發基金
裙帶資本主義
Venture Capital
Reputation
Internationalization
Political Link
IPO
Long-term Performance
Taiwan National Development Fund
Crony Capitalism
日期: 2015
上傳時間: 27-Jul-2015
摘要: 本研究透過台灣創投基金的聲譽、國際化和政治連結等信號(Signal),探討創投基金對於新創公司初次公開發行後的長期表現的影響。本研究之實證結果發現,創投基金的聲譽越高以及國際化程度越高,對於新創公司的長期表現有正向影響,但是創投基金與國發基金的政治連結卻產生非單一面向的結果,政治連結僅對於新創公司的長期研發投入具有正面顯著影響。政治連結會帶來負向的效果可能由於國發基金所推行的政策影響,或者是其中具有裙帶資本主義的干擾,導致受到國發基金所投資的創投基金對於新創公司的長期表現帶來負面影響。由本研究的結果我們可知若新創公司得到具有高聲譽或國際化的創投投資是對於其未來發展是有所幫助,所以新創公司在尋找創投基金合作時,可以以此作為考量的標準。
In this research, venture capital reputation, degrees of internationalization, and the political links formed by venture capitals and Taiwanese National Development Fund are hypothesized to influence the long-run performance of start-ups. By utilizing a unique dataset of venture capital investment, we could investigate the sources of higher long-run performance of venture capital teams. Besides, we also inquire the impact of internationalization and political links of venture capitals on the performance of stat-up business. The results show that venture capitals with higher reputation or degrees of internalization impacts positively on long-term performance of start-ups. However, the political links formed between venture capitals and Taiwanese National Development Fund only affects business innovation measures positively. The policy focused or the crony capitalism long existing between Taiwanese National Development Fund and venture capitals can both be the major reasons to trigger the mixed investment influence. Thus, this research can shed some light on the intrinsic factors driving positive investment results other than the venture capital reputations.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
102258036
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258036
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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