Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78224


Title: Repeated Protection for Sale
Authors: Tung, Chris Y.;Yang, C. C.
楊建成
Contributors: 財政系
Date: 2014-10
Issue Date: 2015-09-03 14:47:53 (UTC+8)
Abstract: This paper addresses whether the efficient equilibria characterized by Grossman and Helpman's one-shot protection-for-sale game are renegotiation-proof in an infinitely repeated setting. We propose a simple strategy profile that can support the efficient, truthful equilibrium in each period as a strongly renegotiation-proof subgame perfect equilibrium. This result provides another plausible reason to explain why the truthful equilibrium may be focal in the game of protection-for-sale. In addition, when the timing of the contributions is specified explicitly, the special interest groups should minimize the upfront payment to the government before policy implementation to reduce the possibility of the collapse of such relational contracts.
Relation: Pacific Economic Review, 19(4), 466-482
Data Type: article
DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.12074
Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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