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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78818| 題名: | 集團企業交易與租稅規避之關聯性研究 Related Party Transactions and Tax Avoidance |
作者: | 曾柏維 Tseng, Po Wei |
貢獻者: | 何怡澄 曾柏維 Tseng, Po Wei |
關鍵詞: | 租稅規避 關係人交易 公司治理 Tax Avoidance Related Party Transaction Corporate Governmance |
日期: | 2015 | 上傳時間: | 1-Oct-2015 | 摘要: | 關係人交易因其特殊之交易性質，經常成為企業進行特殊交易安排之手段。隨著全球化及國際化的發展，企業的營運策略變得更加多元化，營運版圖、營業地點也擴及全球，關係企業間也可以透過關係人交易將所得移轉到低稅率地區，減少整體稅負。\n本文以2002年到2013年之台灣上市公司非均衡追蹤資料 (Unbalanced panel data) 探討關係人交易或不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果指出進行較多關係人交易或較多複雜交易反而使企業租稅規避的程度降低，但進行關係人交易、(較多) 單純交易或複雜交易對企業租稅規避程度則無顯著影響。\n本文也加入法人持股比率、獨立董事席次占董事會席次比率、董事長是否兼任總經理及是否委任大型會計師事務所等4種公司治理變數，檢驗公司治理結構是否會改變關係人交易及不同性質關係人交易對企業租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果顯示司治理結構並沒顯著改變進行 (較多) 關係人交易及進行 (較多) 不同性質關係人交易之企業的租稅規避程度。 Related party transaction, with its special nature, has become a common source for firms to engage in many kinds of manipulation. With the trends of globalization and internationalization, business operating strategies have become more and more diversified, operating territory and operation location have also expanded all over the world. In order to reduce the overall tax payment, related parties can engage in income shifting from high-tax regions to low-tax regions through related party transactions. \nThis study uses the data of the firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2013 to investigate whether engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature influence corporation tax avoidance. The results indicate that firms engaging in more related party transactions and more complex transaction exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance, but engaging in related party transactions, simple transactions and complex transaction do not significantly influence the level of corporate tax avoidance.\nThis study also uses four corporate governance variables- institutional ownership, the rate of independent directors in the board of directors, chairman as CEO, and big 5 accounting firms- to exams whether corporate government have impact on the relationship between related party transaction and corporate tax avoidance. The result shows that corporate governance does not significantly change the level of corporate tax avoidance of the firms engaging (more) in related party transaction or different kinds of related party transaction in nature. |
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Shu, and Y. H. Su (2012), “Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 20, 755-776. | 描述: | 碩士 國立政治大學 財政研究所 102255004 |
資料來源: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102255004 | 資料類型: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | 學位論文 |
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