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Title: Would and Should Government Lie about Economic Statistics: Understanding Opinion Formation Processes through Evolutionary Cellular Automata
Authors: Chen, Shu-Heng
Contributors: 經濟系
Date: 1997
Issue Date: 2015-10-12 13:29:55 (UTC+8)
Abstract: Are there any possible situations in which the state of the economy tomorrow depends on that of the economy today revealed by the government? If so, does the government have any “incentives” to manipulate statistics? Using a simulation approach based on a model of evolutionary cellular automata, this paper tackles the issue by taking explicitly into account self- fulfilling expectations and the existence of multiple equilibria. We find that the government will not always lie, especially when agents use the Bayesian learning algorithm to adjust their reliance on government statistics. Nevertheless, there is an incentive for the government to lie under certain circumstances, that is, when the economy, in terms of our model, is in a cloudy zone or the scale of the pessimistic shock is moderate.
Relation: Simulating social phenomena, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 456. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, 471-490
Data Type: book/chapter
ISBN: 3540633294
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