自發性盈餘預測與銀行風險

Abstract

銀行等金融機構對投資者的信賴程度非常敏感。當所有投資者都缺乏信心而產生擠兌 行為時,投機性的銀行危機便會發生。在這樣的環境下,因為盈餘預測會對投資者的信 心及銀行的穩定有直接的影響,相較於其他產業,金融機構特有的投機性的危機,反而 形成一機制使得銀行管理者的自發性盈餘預測的可姓度增加,而且其訊息洩漏的程度 會隨著投資者的樂觀程度而遞增。此一說實話的機制存在於敏感的金融體系,且有別於 現有文獻所討論的其他機制（包括名譽及社會規範等）。

Financial firms are more vulnerable to the investors` lacking in confidence, and a speculative run could happen when all investors lose their confidence and withdraw simultaneously. In addition to the existing discussions on endogenous misreporting cost such as reputation, propriety and social norm effects, this paper demonstrated that the threat of speculative run can serve as an endogenous misreporting cost which prevents the bank manager from lying in their voluntary disclosures. Hence, voluntary disclosures such as management earnings forecast can be informative, and the degree of information revelation will be positively related to depositors` perspectives on the random investment shock.