Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90747
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dc.creator張芝颯;辛翠玲-
dc.creatorChang, Chih-Sha;Shin, Chuei-Ling-
dc.date2003-05-
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-04T07:15:44Z-
dc.date.available2016-05-04T07:15:44Z-
dc.date.issued2016-05-04T07:15:44Z-
dc.identifier.urihttp://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90747-
dc.description.abstract歐盟經濟整點趨成熟,其對於國際政治經濟有著相當影響力。在全球化與貿易自由化的潮流下,第三國與歐盟之交往愈形密切,常常需要透過國際談判來成協議。歐盟乃一區域整合體,內部包含十五國之共同利益,會員國透過制度達成協議,以利進行對外貿易談判。其主要對外貿易政策之負責機構為:歐盟理事會及執委會,執委會雖為代表歐盟對外談判者,但仍受到理事會之掣肘。理事會對外決策係透過投票制度呈現,而歐盟整合至今,理事會所演變之投票制亦有所改變,從一致決至多數決,在不同投票制度下,所賦予談判代表對外權力與議價區自然有所區別,並影響最後國際協議達成與否,理解此種度面呈現之特性,方能作為與歐盟在國際貿易談判交涉之基礎。-
dc.description.abstractNow representing its 15 member states in international trade negotiations. It will be beneficial to third countries in their trade talks with the EU if they have deeper insights into how the EU forms its position at home. This paper aims to contribute to this goal. Examing the voting systems of the Eu, the paper finds that the various voting systems suggest the different weights the Council and Commission hold in decideing the EU’s external relations. The research further suggests that a third country should observe the voting system adopted for a particular case by the EU in order to form a better understading of the EU’s possible policy outcomes.-
dc.format.extent156 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypetext/html-
dc.relation問題與研究42(3),121-138頁-
dc.relationIssues & studies-
dc.subject歐盟理事會; 執委會; 國際談判; 雙層賽局理論-
dc.subjectEuropean Commission;Council of Europe;international negotiation;two-level game-
dc.title歐盟對外貿易談判-從制度面看執委會與理事會之互動-
dc.title.alternativeThe Interaction between the Council and Commission of the Eu in International Trade Negotiations-
dc.typearticle-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.openairetypearticle-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
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