美國推動聯合國安理會1441號決議案分析

Abstract

二○○三年三月美國對伊拉克發動戰爭，使聯合國安理會於戰前通過之1441號對伊武檢決議隨之失去作用。然美國推動該決議之政策過程，既構成美國對伊政策之不可或缺的一部份，也是探究布希政府外交政策思維的重要課題。本論文之主要目的在於，檢視美國推動此一決議的策略思考、影響因素、決策過程及成效與影響。本文認為，美國之推動1441號決議，是以其先制攻擊為後盾，對伊拉克進行多邊之強制外交政策，俾促進美國之國家利益。布希總統基於對伊進行大規模作戰部署需要較長時間，以及國內民意與國際盟邦均傾向不放棄聯合國路線之考慮下，遂決定推動1441號決議，並藉此推動時程對伊進行壓倒性作戰的準備。惟美國以推動此決議作為對伊動武之依據的企圖心，卻使武檢成效在根本上有其侷限。

The U.S. campaign for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 was an integral part of U.S. policy toward Iraq, although the resolution became ineffectual at the outbreak of U.S-Iraq war on 19 March, 2003. This paper examines the causes, processes, and effects of the U.S. policy. Furthermore, it concludes that the U.S. has adopted a policy of multilateral coercion enforced by the threat of pre-emptive strikes, aimed at promoting its national interests through the U.N. mechanism. The Bush administration`s decision to campaign for Resolution 1441 was made using the persuasive argument that an effective campaign to oust Saddam Hussein would require at least a two-month buildup and as many as 200,000 troops. The U.S. attempt to use the resolution as the rationale for a possible invasion of Iraq undoubtedly also limited the effect of weapons-inspection.