併購案中投資銀行的選擇與顧問費的索取-以美國銀行業為例

Abstract

本文研究銀行業要進行併購時，主併銀行與目標銀行為了要使合併能更順利地進行而雇用投資銀行，同時希望投資銀行所為他們帶來更多的的合併效益。本文依循William and Julapa（2002）所設的三個變數來衡量投資銀行帶來的效益，檢視雇用投資銀行是否對合併案有幫助：第一個變數是併購案完成的機率；第二是完成的速度；第三為合併後主併銀行的利得。並且探討合併雙方支付給投資銀行的顧問費會受到哪些因素的影響。\r\n\r\n 文中選取了銀行業作為資料分析的樣本，期間是以合併宣告日從1990年1月1日到2006年12月31日止，總樣本共有242件合併案。\r\n\r\n 實證結果顯示合併雙方雇用的投資銀行數量越多，不只有更大的機率會合併成功，主併銀行合併後利得也更多，且與合併雙方所支付的顧問費有正向關係。主併銀行雇用更高階的投資銀行，合併從宣告到完成所需要的時間越少。當目標銀行支付越多的顧問費，對於合併完成的機率有重要影響；不過主併銀行卻沒有這現象。

This paper investigates that how the acquirers and targets choose the investment banks in mergers and acquisitions to make these deals successfully. According to William and Julapa（2002）, we proxy the effort put forth by investment banks in three different ways . The first variable is whether the deals complete or not. Another is the number of days between the merger announcement date and the effective date. The other is the post-acquisition gains for the acquirers. We also discuss the advisory fees paid by the acquirers and targets.\r\n \r\n Our samples are about the commercial banks and bank holding companies that includes 242 merger deals announced during the period 1 Jan 1990 to 31 Dec 2006.\r\n\r\n We find the more investment banks be advised, the more likelihood the deals being completed and post-acquisition gains acquirers acquire. This result also has the positive relation with the fees paid by acquirers and targets. We also find that top-tier investment banks advised by acquirers spend less time completing the deals than the lower tier one. Finally, the more advisory fees paid by targets, the more likelihood the deals being completed.